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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the differing sources of the right to property in New Zealand. Protection of the right to 
property exists at common law, under the Magna Carta and under the Public Works Act 1981 . It does not exist under 
sections 21 or 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. To bring in such protection would be outside the 
original intention of these sections. There may, however, be limited procedural protection under section 27 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. These adequately protect non-legislative actions that interfere with private 
property. However this paper will argue that this protection is inadequate when dealing with legislative actions. This 
is because of the role of parliamentary supremacy and the ease at which statutes can override the right. This can be 
done less explicitly and with less scrutiny than would occur if the right was contained in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. By looking at international documents and comparative constitutions it is possible to consider 
whether the right should be included in the Bill of Rights and how to best frame such a right. The paper argues that it 
is appropriate for the right to property to be included in the Bill of Rights . This is because it is a fundamental right, it 
is possible for it to be in written form, and it fits with the original aims and purposes of the Bill of Rights. The paper 
then provides a possible formulation of the right that could be included in the Bill of Rights. It then discusses how 
this formula uses a negative framing, and the phrases "just terms", "public purpose", "enjoyment of their property" 
and "due process of law". 
Word Count: 12, 573 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Property plays an important part in modem capitalist society. It has 
been important enough to be considered as directly related to the ethical 
development of a person. 1 Something of such importance should be protected 
by the rules within our society. In many ways a large number of the rules, 
such as theft and trespass, protect one's property from the interference of 
other individuals. The rules that set out how the government may deal with 
one's private property are not so clear. There is currently limited recognition 
of the fundamental role of property. 
This paper will critically examine how the right to property exists in 
New Zealand, especially with the individual's relationship with the State. It 
will consider whether the current legal protection of private property from the 
State is adequate. It will also consider alternative forms of protection. In 
doing this it will consider whether the right should be contained within the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
II WHAT IS A RIGHT TO PROPERTY? 
Before considering what "the right to property" 1s, one must first 
understand what property is. 
A The "Layman's" Definition 
Property is often considered to be "a thing". This is reflected in the 
initial definition given by the Concise Oxford Dictionary; "something owned; 
a possession. "2 This view of property is inadequate. It does not address the 
1 See Jeremy Waldron The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 3; 
Gregory S Alexander Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776 - 1970 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997) 145. 
2 Della Thompson (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (9 ed, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1995) 1097. 
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range of relationships that exist between people and things.3 The thing itself 
is not property, but should be described as the object of proprietary rights.4 
B Bundle of Rights Theory 
Within the law "property" is now accepted as a person's relationship 
with a thing. The most common5 way to conceptualise this relationship is as a 
"bundle of rights."6 This bundle contains the rights to possess, use, consume, 
destroy, manage, give, lend and sell. 7 The rights of receiving income, being 
secure and maintaining quiet enjoyment are sometimes added to this list. 8 
Property has been assumed to be a bundle of rights in a number of New 
Zealand cases, within a range of contexts.9 
The "bundle of rights" theory refers to the degree of control that a 
person may exercise over things. The theory recognises the important role of 
control over use of an object, 10 but also acknowledges that there are legitimate 
reasons why control can be limited. It reflects the ability of people to use or 
sell objects. It recognises creations, like easements, covenants and leases, 
which have been created by the legal world to reflect the complex 
relationships that have been developed to represent the relationship between 
people and "things". 11 The "bundle of rights" theory also effectively reflects 
3 Such as leases, full ownership (including possession, title and control) as well as things that 
are commonly owned or not "owned" at all. 
4 McCaughy v Commissioner of Stamp Duties ( 1945) 46 NSWR 192, 20 I per Jordan CJ, with 
reference to Jn re Earnshaw Wall [1885] 3 CH 156. 
5 Michael A Heller "The Boundaries of Private Property" (1999) 108 Yale LJ 1163, 1191. 6 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258 para 17 (HCA) Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and 
Hayne JJ; Minister for the Army v Dalziel ( 1944) 68 CLR 261, 285 Rich J. 7 JE Penner The Idea of Property in Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 2. It should be 
noted that Penner does not strictly follow this theory, but focuses on "exclusive use". 8 Craig Anthony Arnold "The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests" 
(2002) 26 Harv Envtl LR 281 , 285 with reference to AM Honore "Ownership" in AG Guest 
(ed) Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, London, 1961) I 07, 113-24. 9 Dahya v Dahya [ 1991] 2 NZLR 150; Rabadan v Gale [ 1996] 3 NZLR 220; Mil/ns v Borek 
[ 1986] 1 NZLR 302; Re Marshall (Deceased) & Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Public 
Trustee [1965] NZLR 85 l. The same idea is also used in the USA decision of Penn Central 
Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104, 130-131 (Brennan J for the Court). 10JE Penner The Idea of Property in Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997); Yanner v Eaton 
( 1999) 166 ALR 25 8 para 21 (HCA) Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 11 See 2 Blackstone *20. 
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the relationship that people can have with intangible objects that are 
considered to be property. 
The theory also reflects the inter-personal relationships that exist. 12 
By creating rights, there are automatically duties upon other people in society 
towards your property (for example not to enter your land or damage your 
things). 13 
The theory also concentrates on the "thingness" 14 of property. 
Inevitably the law must reflect the view that the object itself is important. 
The bundle of rights theory does this by concentrating on the relationship that 
a person has with the thing. 
C How This Paper Will Define Property 
Throughout this paper property will be treated as a bundle of rights. 
This best reflects the complex nature of property in the 21 st century. The idea 
of the bundle of rights reflects both the relationship between the person and 
the object (i.e. use of the object) and the person and other people in society 
(i.e. as one person uses/possesses the object other people cannot use it). It 
also reflects the "thingness" of property, and the need for there to be an object 
of the right. 
III THE RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
International documents and the practices of other countries are 
important when considering New Zealand law. They offer a comparison of 
whether the protection New Zealand has is of a high standard, and what legal 
12 JE Penner "The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property" (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711, 724-
734, with reference to Wesley N Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In 
Judicial Reasoning And Other Legal Essays (Walter W. Cooked 1923) 65-114. 
13 This is reflected in Penner's theory where there is a need for an in re or thing before there 
can be property. Penner's view is that duties created by an in re are not personal, but reflect 
the thing itself. It is irrelevant who the owner of a particular thing is, the duty not to destroy it 
is the same. JE Penner The Idea of Property in law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 23-24. 
14 Craig Anthony Arnold "The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests" 
(2002) 26 Harv Envtl LR 281, 335. 
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.. 
protection should be adopted in New Zealand. In this situation they also help 
in understanding what "the right to property" protects. They, along with the 
constitutions of other countries help to show how the right can be protected in 
different ways, and can help decide what protection is most suitable for New 
Zealand. 
International documents, to which New Zealand is a party, play an 
important role in our legal system. There is a general principle that statutes 
should not infringe our international obligations. 15 However, the application 
of this principle varies depending on the status of the treaty. Where the treaty 
is incorporated into law, the answer is clear. 16 However when treaties are not 
incorporated questions arise as to how explicit a statute that is in conflict with 
a treaty needs to be in order to supersede the international obligation. 17 The 
general view is that it needs to be reasonably clear to overrule such an 
international obligation. International documents to which New Zealand is a 
party must be considered whenever an executive decision is made. 18 
A Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
contains a right to property. It states: 
(I) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
New Zealand is a party to the UDHR. 19 It has not been incorporated 
within New Zealand law and therefore its status is unclear.20 Its place in New 
Zealand law is weakened further because it is the predecessor to the 
15 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2001 
edition <www.justice.govt.nz/lac/pubs/200 I / leg islati ve _guide_ 2000/checkl ist. html> (last 
accessed 17 July 2003) 3 .1.2 point # 16. 
16 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [ 1981) 1 NZLR 222. 
17 The problem is very much like that faced when looking at fundamental common law rules. 
See Part V B Other Restrictions. 
18 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994) 2 NZLR 257. 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights Division 
<www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/humanrights/overview.htrnl> (last accessed 22 September 2003) 
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international covenant for the protection of civil and political rights (ICCPR) 
which has (at least partially) been incorporated into New Zealand law.21 The 
UDHR therefore plays a limited role in New Zealand law, offering little 
protection to property. 
Article 17 is framed in very broadly. It has both a positive and a 
negative branch. Sub-article one is framed in the positive, giving everyone 
the ability to own property. It is unclear whether this means that everyone 
must have property or whether it is limited to everyone being able to have 
property. It is not generally accepted that everyone must have property, 
therefore such vague wordings should be avoided. The negatively worded 
sub-article two better reflects the restriction on governmental power usually 
associated with the right. Its aim is to prevent the taking of property without 
reason. Because the UDHR is a broad, guiding document, it is not very 
detailed. Any written protection of the right to property that is included in a 
country's constitution needs to be clearer than this guiding instrument. This is 
because any domestic right should suit local conditions and be easily 
enforceable, rather than aiming to be a sweeping guideline applicable around 
the world. 
B ICCPR 
The ICCPR contains no provision that protects a person's right to 
property. It is partially incorporated into New Zealand law via the Long Title 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights). The 
incorporation of this Treaty lowers the significance of the unincorporated 
UDHR which protects similar rights. Because the ICCPR did not include the 
right to property it may be a sign that the right to property is not greatly 
important. 
20 See Part V B Other Restrictions. 
21 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Long Title. 
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C The European Convention on Human Rights 
The right to property is contained in Protocol 1, Article 1 of the 
ECHR. It is phrased in the positive, and guarantees everyone peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions. It makes express reference to non-deprivation 
except in the public interest subject to the conditions provided for by law and 
by the general principles of international law. 
In Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden22 the Court stated that Protocol 1 
sets out three rules regarding the rights to property. The first is the principle 
of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second covers deprivation of 
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third rule recognises 
that states are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for that 
purpose. These can be further summarised to cover the ideas of 
proportionality, expropriation and regulation or limitations. 
( a) Proportionality 
In Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom,
23 the principles set out in 
Sporrong were applied by the European Court of Human Rights. The court's 
view was that proportionality needed a fair balance to be struck between the 
interests of the community and the rights of the individual. While 
compensation will almost always be an implicit condition within this balance, 
but there is no guarantee of compensation with every infringement.
24 
Other 
relevant considerations include predictable national developments, and the 
general economic nature of the transaction. If a deprivation meets this 
balancing test, it will not contravene the Convention. 
22 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 para 61 (Eur Ct HR). 
23 Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom ( 1986) 8 EHRR 329 (Eur Ct HR). 
24 Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329 para 121-122 (Eur Ct HR). 
Lack of payment will often go towards showing that the interference was disproportionate . 
10 
(b) Expropriation 
In Sporrong it was deemed that although there was no full 
expropriation the right was still breached. 25 The positive nature of the right 
means that expropriation is not required for the right to be enforceable. This 
effectively spreads the application of the right more widely than constitutions 
drafted negatively, that often require the action of actual deprivation or 
expropriation before they are enforceable. 
( c) Regulation/Limitations 
This rule recognises that the State may control the use of property and 
impose taxes on property without compensating the property owner. 
However, as in most other jurisdictions, the court has recognised that there is 
often a fine line between permissible regulation and regulation that is in effect 
a deprivation. 
The second and third rules above are considered to be standard for 
deprivation/expropriation clauses.26 They are concerned with the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property and should be construed in the light of the 
general rule contained in the first principle.
27 There is a wide margin of 
appreciation allowed by the Strasbourg Court when applying this article. This 
is because of the "particular dangers of interference in social and economic 
decisions of elected govemments".
28 
IV CONSTITUTIONS IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
In considering both whether the protection that we currently have is 
adequate, and the best way for New Zealand to frame a right to property, it is 
appropriate to make comparisons with other countries. New Zealand has a 
25 The case involved prohibitions that were placed on the use and control of property. 
26 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 999. 
27 James and others v United Kingdom ( 1986) 8 EHRR 213 (Eur Ct HR). 
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history of using other countries' experiences and phrases when forming its 
statutes.29 
A Canada 
I The Canadian Bill of Rights30 
The Canadian Bill of Rights contains a provision that directly protects 
property. Section l(a) provides: 
1. It is hereby recognised and declared that in Canada there have 
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, 
national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, namely, 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person 
and enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except by the due process of law. (Emphasis added) 
This unentrenched section is still in force despite the enactment of the 
Charter of Rights. Very few cases deal with the section. It is viewed as "a 
relatively feeble and underemployed right."
31 This is because the courts have 
been reluctant to invalidate laws in conflict with it, it is not entrenched, and its 
application is limited to federal laws and individuals.
32 This is reflected in 
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen3
3 where property rights were discussed 
with reference to the common law, not the Canadian Bill of Rights.
34 Little 
28 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999). 
29 For example much of the Bill of Rights was based on other country's constitutional 
documents. This is demonstrated in the White Paper where most articles have comparisons 
with other countries. 
30 The Canadian Bill of Rights SC 1960 c 44 reprinted in RSC 1985 appendix III. (Canadian 
Bill of Rights). 
31 Richard W Bauman "Property Rights in the Canadian Constitutional Context" (1992) 8 
SAJHR 344, 350. 
32 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 86; Richard W Bauman "Property Rights in the Canadian 
Constitutional Context" (1992) 8 SAJHR 344, 350. 
33 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen ( 1978) 88 DLR 3d. 462. 
34 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 90. The discussion related to the difference between expropriation 
and regulation. 
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thought was therefore given to the section, even before the introduction of the 
Charter. 
The section is framed in the negative, as a person' s "right not to be 
deprived [of their enjoyment of property] except by due process of law". This 
is very close to a "classic formulation" of a property clause. It is only 
possible to be deprived of property if proper process has been followed. The 
clause is more similar to the US due process clause35 than the takings clause.36 
It lacks specific mention of expropriation or compensation. This creates an 
impression of procedural safeguards only, and not a guarantee of 
compensation.37 However it is possible that the guarantee ensures substantive 
justice. It could then be argued that due process requires compensation. 
The applicability of the Canadian Bill of Rights is limited. The lack of 
case law on point makes it hard to discern the meaning of the section. With 
the enactment of the entrenched Canadian Charter in 1982, however, there is 
an indication that Canada, who we modelled our Bill of Rights on, considered 
that the right to property was not appropriate or important enough to include 
in an entrenched constitutional document. The right ' s exclusion, though, may 
reflect the perception that enforcing such a right when it is entrenched is 
difficult. There was also a strong belief that the common law protection was 
adequate.38 These are useful comparisons when considering whether the right 
to property should be contained in our Bill of Rights, especially when 
considering the sufficiency of the common law. The ineffectiveness of the 
provision in the Canadian Bill of Rights is an important consideration for New 
Zealand. The Canadians thought that the common law protection was 
sufficient. It is not so useful if considering how New Zealand should frame 
such a right, as it is hard to see the implications of the way that it is phrased. 
35 US Constitution, amendment XIV. 
36 US Constitution, amendment V. 
37 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 88. 
38 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen ( 1978) 88 DLR 3d. 462. 
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2 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms39 
The entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms is supreme law. It 
contains no section that directly protects property. Peter Hogg's view is that 
"the Charter omission of property rights from the list of protected rights is 
certainly significant."40 Despite the admission that there was no specific 
reference to "property rights" in the Charter, The Queen v Fisherman 's Wharf 
Ltcf'1 decided that section 7 extended to the right not to be deprived of 
property.42 This decision was heavily criticised in Re Workers' Compensation 
Board of Nova Scotia v Coastal Rentals Ltd.43 Attorney-General of Quebec v 
Irwin Toy Limitecf4makes it clear that section 7 of the Charter does not protect 
property, and that property cannot enter into the sphere of protection by the 
back door.45 
B South Africa 
The right to property is an express right contained in section 25 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. The section aims to 
balance individual and community rights. It is a comparatively detailed 
provision. It specifically deals with the South African issues of rebuilding and 
land reforms. 
39 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 
1982 (UK), sch B). 
40 Peter W Hogg Canada Act Annotated (Carswell, Toronto, 1982) 28 . 
41 The Queen v Fisherman 's Wharf Ltd ( 1982) 135 DLR (3d) 307, 315-316 . 
42 This section is very similar to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 21 . 
43 Re Workers ' Compensation Board of Nova Scotia v Coastal Rentals Ltd (1983) 12 DLR 
( 41h) 564 (NSSC). The decision was described as "aggressive" and as containing " intellectual 
leaps". 
44 Attorney-General of Quebec v Irwin Toy Limited (1989) I SCR 927; Andre Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 
87 . 
45 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 89. It is said to be one of the only conclusions about the property 
clause in Canadian law that seems certain. This is of relevance to the attempts in New 
Zealand to use sections 21 and 27 of Bill of Rights Act 1990 as sections protecting property, 
See Part VII New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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I The General Clause 
The general clause of the South African Constitution has a negative 
formulation.46 South Africans cannot claim protection under this section 
unless their property has been expropriated, or if they have been deprived of 
it. The corresponding clause in the 1993 temporary constitution was drafted 
as a positive or "umbrella" right. It allowed every person to acquire, hold and 
dispose ofrights in property.47 
2 Expropriation and Deprivation 
Under section 25(1) no one may be deprived of property except in 
terms of law of general application and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Under section 25(2) the government may expropriate 
property only if it is for a public purpose or in the public interest, and if there 
is compensation.48 
3 Compensation 
The statute is explicit as to what should be considered when deciding 
if the compensation offered is appropriate.49 The compensation must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances. so 
This reflects the principle of proportionality, balance between the public 
interest and the individual. 
46 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 25( I) describes the right "not to be 
deprived of' property. 
47 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 28( I). "Every person shall have the 
right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of the right 
permits, to dispose of such rights." 
48 Compensation needs to be agreed to by those affected or decided by/approved by the court. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 25(2)(b ). 
49 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 25(3). 
50 This is a consideration of both the amount and method or manner of payment. 
A list of possible circumstances for the court to consider is also 
~ included. 51 These include the current use of the property, the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property, the market value of the property, the 
extent of direct State investment and subsidy in the acquisition and the 
beneficial capital improvement of the property, and the purpose of the 
expropriation. These specific considerations are in addition to the general 
principle of proportionality set out above. 
4 Land reform issues 
One of the problems faced in South Africa in 1996 was achieving a 
balance between protecting property rights (and the economic security and 
confidence this ensures) and allowing future governments to attempt to 
redistribute land so as to correct the racial skew that existed in property.
52 
The final balance was achieved in section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996. This specifically states that the nation's 
commitment to land reform is in the public interest. This means that where 
land is expropriated for land reform, there is automatically a valid public 
interest within section 25(2). 
Section 25(8) further clarifies this position. This is a difficult section 
as it states that no provision in section 25 can stop the legislature from taking 
action to achieve land reform, in order to redress past racial discrimination, as 
long as section 36 is complied with. This implies that the government can 
deviate from the equitable and compensation principles in the rest of section 
25 in cases of land reform, and instead only comply with section 36. 
Section 36 is the general limitations clause of the South African Bill of 
Rights. If a right has been infringed but the State can demonstrate that the 
51 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 25(3)(a)-(e). 
52 This was particularly important, as power is often proportionate to land ownership. 
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criteria in section 36 are satisfied, the Bill of Rights is not breached. The 
Constitutional Court considered section 36 to represent proportionality.
53 
If property is expropriated and no compensation is paid, but the action 
can be justified under section 36(1 ), then it is valid. The section 36 criteria 
are that if a law of general application is acceptable if it has limited the right 
for reasons that can be considered reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
54 
Many of 
the criteria that justify the limitation of the right have already been 
internalised within section 25. The explicit references in section 25 must be 
considered as extensions, qualifications, and further explications of this 
general limitation provision. 55 Therefore the additional statements on land 
reforms are in the document merely for clarity. 
C United States 
The Constitution of the United States of America contains two 
sections that relate to the right to property. These are the fifth amendment and 
the fourteenth amendment. 
I The Fifth Amendment 
The fifth amendment looks at whether the taking is for a public 
purpose, absent that, the taking is void. 56 It is known as the "takings clause". 
There are two kinds of takings; physical invasion (where the 
government appropriates or occupies private property) and regulatory (where 
53 This is based on the Canadian decision R v Oakes ( 1986) 26 DLR 4th 200. The change in 
language that occurred to section 36 from 1993 to 1996 reflected a close alignment with the 
decision in R v Oakes. S v J\lanamela and Another (Director-General of Justice i ntervening) 
2000 (5) BCLR491 (CC). 
54 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s 36(1). This is very similar to section 5 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
55 Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 358. 
56 James L Oakes '"Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today" (1981) 56 Wash L Rev 
583, 603. 
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the government implements regulations that restrict use and affect the value of 
the property57). The court has found the former easier to deal with as it is 
always clear when a Government agency physically invades and talces over a 
tract of land (in whole or in part) then compensation must be paid to the 
property owner. 58 Challenges to regulatory actions are much more difficult, 
requmng the court to weigh up the competing interests involved in each 
situation. This has lead to confused case law, as it is not clear from the outset 
whether the intervention is a talcing. 
59 It has however led to the use of a 
"proportionality" consideration and a balancing test similar to that of other 
countries. Considerations include6
0 the advancement of legitimate State 
interests and the character of the governmental action, the economic impact on 
the claimant61 and whether these have lead to the claimant being singled out. 
2 The Fourteenth Amendment 
The fourteenth amendment is the "due process" clause. It is 
negatively worded. The clause ensures that when property is talcen the 
process that is used is appropriate. 
D Australia 
Section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution deals with 
governmental powers relating to property. It expressly provides that the 
Commonwealth Parliament has power to malce laws regarding the acquisition 
57 "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognised as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 
US 393, 415 (1922) Holmes J. 
58 Susan E Spokes "Florida Rock Industries Inc v United States: Tipping the scales in favour 
of Private Property Rights at the Public's Expense" (1995) 47 MLR 501, 504. Property 
holders are compensated even if the invasion is de minimus. 
59 This is a major part of the recent jurisprudence of this clause. Cases such as Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 have dealt with the issue extensively. This is an 
extremely interesting and complex series of cases however space restrictions have meant that 
they have not been thoroughly discussed. 
60 Susan E Spokes "Florida Rock Industries Inc v United States: Tipping the scales in favour 
of Private Property Rights at the Public 's Expense" (1995) 47 MLR 501 , 505. 
61 This includes the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations. 
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of property. Property can be acquired on just terms from any person (or State) 
for any purpose in respect of which Parliament has power to make any laws.
62 
Though framed as granting a positive power on Parliament, it is 
essentially framed in the negative.63 It does not give citizens an express right 
to hold their property. It operates by having a restrictive effect on other 
constitutional powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, by requiring just 
terms whenever there is compulsory acquisition.
64 The section does not apply 
to the non-legislature.65 Although the clause is drafted as a negative clause, 
the effect of the clause is said to be the same as would have occurred if it had 
been drafted as a "right to property."
66 
I Just Terms 
This part of the section protects the citizens as it fetters the powers of 
Parliament. What are "just terms" are considered in light of reasonableness 
and fairness in the situation. 
67 
Generally the terms of acquisition are, within reason, matters for 
legislative judgment and discretion.6
8 However the terms need to actually be 
just. Parliament is bound by the terms of the Constitution and the courts are 
62 It refers only to the ability of the Commonwealth to make laws, leaving open Executive 
action and the use of prerogative powers. Under prerogative power there are still restrictions 
such as in times and for use in an emergency, and that there be payment of compensation. 
R W Baker "The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth" in Hon Else-
Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution (2 ed, The Law Book Company of 
Australasia Pty Ltd, Melbourne 1961) 194. 
63 Andre Yan der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co 
Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 40. 
64 RW Baker "The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth" in Hon Else-
Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution (2 ed, The Law Book Company of 
Australasia Pty Ltd, Melbourne 1961) 197. One unusual aspect of this is that valid laws made 
under this section must also be laws with respect to some other Commonwealth legislative 
power. Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth of Australia (1948) 76 CLR I, 300-
301. 
65 The state's regulatory power or police power is not subject to guarantee of compensation. 
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 179 CLR 155, 
171 Mason CJ Deane and Gaudron JJ. 
66 WH Blakely & Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth ( 1953) 87 CLR 50 I, 521. 
67 Tom Allen The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000) 64. 
68 Minister for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261, 291 Starke J. 
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there to make sure that the Constitution is followed. The court is willing to 
assess whether the terms are just, with Parliament's view on whether the terms 
are just being only one matter to be considered.
69 It does not matter if the 
court thinks the terms could be fairer. 
70 The court also has regard to the 
interests of the community. The fact that land is not being used ( or not being 
put to its best use) is irrelevant. Also irrelevant is any diminution in value that 
might arise from the purposes that the land might be put, and any loss of profit 
that may have occurred if sold in another way. Also excluded is the 
prospective loss of income upon re-investment of capital. 
71 This is part of the 
process of spreading the cost across the community.
72 
If just terms are not provided, then the attempted acquisition is not 
only null and void but also unlawful. It could render the Commonwealth 
liable in trespass or conversion. 
73 
There is no formal limitations clause within section 51 (xxxi). This 
has lead to the use of the phrase "just terms" acting as an internal limitation 
prov1s10n. It is through this that the idea of reasonableness and 
proportionality is brought into being. This is especially through an 
investigation into whether the "means justify the ends" or whether the action 
is just incidental to operating another power. 
74 
69Australian Apple & Pear Marketing Board v Tanking (1941) 66 CLR 77, 104 Rich J. 
Andrews v Howell ( 1941) 65 CLR 255 states that it is not part of the judicial function , this is 
not negated by Tanking case and Pou/tons Case (1953) 89 CLR 540. 
70 R W Baker "The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth" in Hon Else-
Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution (2 ed, The Law Book Company of 
Australasia Pty Ltd, Melbourne 1961) 205. 
7 1 Tom Allen The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000) 196. 
72 R W Baker "The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth" in Hon Else-
Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution (2 ed, The Law Book Company of 
Australasia Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1961) 206. 
73 Minister for the Army v Dalziel ( 1944) 68 CLR 261, 306. 
74 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia ( 1994) 179 CLR 155, 
179 Brennan J. This shows that the section is not an absolute rule and the legitimacy of the 
legislature's actions is questioned. Andre Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A 
Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 71. 
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V PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY 
Parliamentary supremacy plays a very important part in the New 
Zealand legal system. It means that Parliament has the power to pass any law 
that it sees fit and that the courts are unable to strike down legislation. 
Because of this it is hard to control, by non-electoral means, the actions of the 
legislature, even if they are in contravention of other important principles. 
Despite this there are a number of ways that to a certain extent parliamentary 
supremacy can be limited. This can be through the Bill of Rights, 
fundamental principles of the common law, international treaty obligations or 
statutes that place obligations or restrictions on how the legislature may act. 
This section will look into how effective these tools are in limiting the power 
of the legislature. 
A The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights is aimed at curbing State powers and actions in 
relation to citizens. Parliament should not legislate in contravention of the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights. However due to parliamentary 
sovereignty, reinforced by section 4 of the Bill of Rights, they can do so. The 
court has adopted an approach to deal with situations where a statute that is in 
conflict with the Bill of Rights. 75 This is a five-step process. 
76 The first step 
is identifying different interpretations of the words used, which are properly 
open. If only one meaning is open, it must be applied. If there is more than 
one the court must follow section 6 and decide which meaning least limits the 
right. The third step is to identify the extent, if any, to which that meaning 
limits the right. The fourth step is to consider whether this limitation is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, within section 5. The 
court will then make an indication as to whether this is so.
77 This makes it 
75 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
76 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 para 17-19 (CA). 
77 This idea of a "judicial declaration of inconsistency" is contentious. See Andrew S 
Butler "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency-- A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights 
Armoury?" [2000] NZ Law Review 43 . 
21 
clear to everyone whether the court thinks that the statute is "acceptable" or 
not. If it is not justified the court must still apply the meaning due to section 
4. It means that the court will only apply the statute in a way that offends the 
right if it is absolutely necessary. 
B Other Restrictions 
It is possible for fundamental principles of the common law, 
international treaties and some other documents to also impact on 
parliamentary supremacy. The general rule is that statutes will be read 
consistently with such rules. However if the statute contains clear, express 
words, the court must apply them. It is currently unclear how explicit such 
statutes must be. This is based on the principle of legality, which "means that 
parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political 
cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of 
their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic 
process." 78 The idea put forward is that when fundamental rights are being 
removed express language or necessary implication is required. 
79 Wells v 
Newfoundlancf0states that there needs to be an explicit statement that the 
principle is being overturned, before fundamental principles of the common 
law can be overturned by the passing of a statute. This is supported by the 
Legislative Advisory Committee, which states that there needs to be explicit 
statutory wording to override a right.
81 However Claydon v Attorney 
General82 held that it was sufficient that Parliament made it obvious that they 
intended to overturn the plaintiffs' rights. 
83 
78 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms and another, above, 131 
Lord Hoffman. 
79 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms and another, above, 131 
Lord Hoffman. 
80 Wells v Newfoundland [1999] 3 SCR 199. 
81 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2001 
edition < www.justice.govt.nz/lac/pubs/2001 / legislative _guide_ 2000/checklist.html> (last 
accessed 17 July 2003) Chapter 3 "Introduction" and Chapter 3 Part I . 
82 Claydon v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 130 (HC) Goddard J. 
83 This case dealt specifically with government actions discharging property rights without 
compensation. It can, however, be easily distinguished from other situations involving 
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Under these principles it is unclear how specific Parliament needs to 
be to overturn a protected right. If they are explicit the answer is clear and the 
court, unless the breach is considered to be of such importance that the court 
will act to strike it down,
84 will have to apply it. Due to Claydon it may mean 
that Parliament will attempt to, or inadvertently, override rights without being 
entirely specific. This would mean that the rights are not adequately protected 
as they could be overturned easily. 
VI SOURCES OF THE RIGHT IN NEW ZEALAND 
A The Public Works Act 
The Public Works Act 1981 (PW A) reqmres compensation for the 
expropriation of property for the purposes of public works. Its application is 
limited to land used for public works (government or local work that the 
crown is authorised to do). 
85 The PW A sets out procedural requirements that 
need to be met when taking land. There are separate requirements for 
acquisitions and land taken by agreement. In addition to the PWA's 
procedural protections, section 23 requires takings to be reasonably necessary. 
There are also specific criteria that set out how compensation is to be 
determined. It is possible to object to any compensation or valuation,
86 as 
well as the taking itself. 
87 
property because the rights were of a personal nature as they were under an employment 
contract. 
84 This will only happen in the strongest of cases. See Cooke J's view that "some common 
law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override them." Taylor v 
New Zealand Poultry Board [ 1984] 1 NZLR 394, 398 (CA) Cooke J; "Fundamentals" [ 1988] 
NZLJ 158 and the 1984 Dethridge Memorial address to the Maritime Law Association of 
Australia and New Zealand "Practicalities of Bill of Rights". 
85 Public Works Act 1981 s 2. "Local work" means a work constructed or intended to be 
constructed by or under the control of a local authority, or for the time being under the control 
of a local authority: "Government work" means a work or an intended work that is to be 
constructed, undertaken, established, managed, operated, or maintained by or under the 
control of the Crown or any Minister of the Crown for any public purpose; and includes land 
held or to be acquired for the purposes of the Conservation Act 1987 or any of the Acts 
specified in Schedule 1 to that Act (except land to which section 9A of the Foreshore and 
Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 1991 applies), even where the purpose of holding or 
acquiring the land is to ensure that it remains in an undeveloped state. 
86 Complaints are made to the Valuation Tribunal. Public Works Act 1981 s 59 and Part 5. 
87 To the Environment Court. Public Works Act 1981 s 24. 
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A major1imitation of the PW A is its limited applicability. It applies 
only to · the actions of the executive or local governments. Due to 
parliamentary supremacy it is possible for the legislature to override the 
PW A.88 The other limitations are that it applies only to land being used for 
public works. Apart from these limitations the protection is appropriate. It 
covers the money being paid, whether there is an appropriate reason for the 
taking, and also contains procedural protections. 
B The Magna Carta 
Under section 3(1) and the First Schedule of the Imperial Laws 
Application Act 1988, Ch 29 of the Magna Carta is still in force in New 
Zealand. The text of this is: 89 
29 Imprisonment, etc contrary to law. Administration of justice - NO 
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or 
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise 
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him but by lawful 
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we 
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. (Emphasis added) 
This potentially protects the right to property through the phrase "no 
freeman shall be ... disseised of his freehold ... but by ... the law of the land." 
1 The Case Law 
Russell v Minister of Lands90 involved questions of compensation for 
the taking of land. It held that it could not "be presumed that the Legislature 
intended to force such a bargain as would be advantageous to the 
Government, but unfair to the owner of the land."
91 To do so would be to 
88 This is based on the principle that the current Parliament cannot bind future Parliaments. 
89 Ch 29 (1297) 25 Edw I (Magna Carta). 
90 Russell v Minister of Lands ( 1898) 17 NZLR 241 (SC). 
91 Russell v Minister of Lands, above, 250 Pennefather J for the Court. 
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violate the c29 of the Magna Carta.92 This means that where a statute takes 
property it would be a breach of the Magna Carta if adequate compensation 
was not paid. 
In Cooper v Attorney-Generaf3 Baragwanath J stated that our 
constitutional safeguard of property is Ch 29 of the Magna Carta, but because 
subsequent statutes are the "law of the land" they override protection offered 
by the Magna Carta. Therefore whenever a statute authorises the taking of 
property, the Magna Carta does not protect property rights. Where there is no 
specific law authorising such conduct, however, it would breach of the Magna 
Carta. 
In Westco Lagan v Attorney-Genera/94 Westco Lagan (WCL) argued 
that the cancellation of, what they believed to be, a contract by legislation 
without compensation was an "expropriation of property rights otherwise than 
in accordance with the law of the land."95 WCL argued that the departure 
from law was the breach of sections 21, 27(1) and 27(3) of the Bill of Rights . 
McGechan J viewed the Magna Carta as having its place in criminal due 
process and was not "much minded to view it as some early Public Works Act 
compensation statute."96 He felt that he was not in a position to decide that 
"disseised of his freehold" included the unusual situation of abolition of 
contractual rights to supply goods without compensation. While he 
considered Russell v Minister of Lands and Cooper v Attorney-General he was 
"reluctant to treat Baragwanath J's passing and general reference to "property 
rights" as a considered finding that all property rights of any nature 
whatsoever are covered by Magna Carta c 29.97 His view was that "freehold" 
applied only to land, and that without more thorough analysis could not 
extend it to cover other forms of property. 
92 Russell v Minister of Lands, above, 250 Pennefather J for the Court. 
93 Cooper v Attorney-General [ 1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
94 Westco Lagan v Attorney General [200 I] I NZLR 40 (HC) McGechan J. 
95 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 50 para 35 . 
96 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 51 para 42. 
25 
2 Comments on the Case Law 
The Magna Carta is a possible form of protection for property rights in 
the New Zealand legal system. However it does have a number of drawbacks. 
The first limitation is the term "freehold". McGechan J limited this 
term to freehold interests in land, despite comments made by Baragwanath J 
that it should apply to a range of property. I believe that McGechan's view is 
incorrect. While the Magna Carta should not be given a meaning that was not 
intended, it is acceptable to interpret Acts in line with "circumstances as they 
arise".98 This allows older Acts to still be applicable as society changes,
99 if 
the developments are "within the mischief that the Act was meant to cure."
100 
Extending the interpretation of property from land to the "bundle of rights" 
definition is possible under this analysis. The mischief, the Crown using its 
power to take property, is just as applicable under the wider definition of 
property. This approach also follows the purposive approach to interpretation. 
The purpose of constricting powers of the crown with regards to criminal 
process and the taking of property is the same under either definition of 
property. 101 While, under current case law, it seems unclear whether the 
term freehold refers only to land, it is possible for the definition to be 
extended. If this were to occur this limitation would disappear. 
The other limitation is the reference to "but by the law of the land". 
This means that the Magna Carta does not protect property taken through a 
statute. This means that whenever property is taken the statute must be clear 
that there is a taking without compensation.
102 While this does increase 
awareness of the effect of the statute and requires clarity from legislatures, it 
97 Westco Lagan v Attorney General [2001] 1 NZLR 40, 51 para 39 (HC) McGechan J. 
98 Interpretation Act 1999 s 6. 
99 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 200 l, 30. 
100 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 2001, 30. 
101 "William Penn summarised the Magna Carta thus: 'first. It asserts Englishmen to be free; 
that's liberty. Secondly, they that have free-holds, that's Property."' Gerald Gaus "Property, 
Rights and Freedom" in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul (eds) Property 
Rights (Cambridge University Press, Place, Year) 209. 
102 There are, however, issues as to exactly how explicit the statute must be, as the decision in 
Claydon implies that the statute only needs to make it clear. See Part V B Other Restrictions. 
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does not prevent such takings, require compensation or a valid reason for the 
action. There is, however, greater political accountability beca;use the 
government is saying outrighl that they are taking someone's property, and 
are therefore open to the resulting criticism. Clarity also means that takings 
cannot "slip through" by accident. 
The Magna Carta does protect takings of property that are not done 
through a statute. There is protection from actions by the executive. 
C The Common Law 
There is a common law principle that property will not be expropriated 
without adequate compensation. Attorney General v De Keyser 's Royal Hotel 
Ltd1 °3 sets out the common law rule in favour of compensation, which can 
only be ousted by explicit statutory provision. 104 The principle of "without 
an explicit statutory provision" is a difficult one. There has been 
disagreement within New Zealand as to how explicit such provisions need to 
be. 105 The general principle is that they need to be quite clear to overturn such 
principles. The common law rule applies to non-legislative actions and 
legislation that is silent on the matter. This means that compensation is 
presumed when there is executive action. 
The Legislative Advisory Council (LAC) has compiled a check.list for 
legislative drafters. Part of this check.list deals with the relationship between 
statutes and other recognised rights. The LAC notes that the court "can be 
faced with a difficult task when it is not clear whether the statute intended to 
deprive a person of the common law recognised right".
106 One of the listed 
103 Attorney General v De Keyser 's Royal Hotel Ltd [ 1920] AC 508 (HL) 
104 See also Tom Allen "Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right Not to be Deprived of 
Property" (1993) 42 Intl & Comp LQ 523. Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd 
was applied in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen ( 1978) 88 DLR 3d. 462 in a discussion as 
to whether a regulation amounted to an expropriation. 
105 See discussion in Part V B Other Restrictions . 
106 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2001 
edition <www.justice.govt.nz1lac/pubs/200 I / legislative _guide _2000/checklist.html> (last 
accessed 17 July 2003) Chapter 3 "Introduction" and Chapter 3 Part I. 
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rights is that "property will not be expropriated without full compensation."
107 
The guidelines state: "whete legislation would constitute a taking of property 
and it is not intended that coinpensation will be paid, the legislation should 
make this quite clear." 108 This means legislation needs to specifically say that 
compensation will not be given. This applies to "vested rights"
109 so covers 
more than just land. 
VII NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
A number of overseas countries have included protection of the right 
to property in their written, constitutional documents. Although New Zealand 
does not have a written constitution, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
protects many of the rights usually contained in such documents. The Bill of 
Rights does not explicitly protect property, however, it has been argued that 
sections 27 and 21 protect private property. 
A Section 27(1) 
It has been argued that section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights protects 
property. The section is in "Part II Civil and Political Rights" under the 
immediate heading "Search, Arrest and Detention". It states
110 
27. Right to Justice - (1) Every person has the right to the observance of the 
principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which 
has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
107 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 200! 
edition, above, 3.1.2 point# 11. To support this position the guidelines cite Cooper v Attorney 
General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) Baragwanath J and Wells v Newfoundland [ 1999] 3 SCR 
199. 
108 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2001 
edition, above, 3.2.3 "Guidelines". It also states that consideration should be given to 
whether compensation should be paid to those affected. 
109 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation 2001 
edition, above, Chapter 3 Part 2 "Have vested rights been altered?" and 3 .2.1 "the question is 
whether or not legislation removing property rights should also provide for compensation for 
the loss of such rights." 
11 0 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s27 ( l ). 
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The arguments surrounding the section are both procedural and 
substantive. 
I Procedural Protection 
The procedural element has been argued on the basis that decisions 
about taking property are "determinations in respect of that person's rights." 
Therefore some form of consultation with the affected person needs to occur 
before a decision is made. 111 In Lumber Specialties v Hodgson
112 the plaintiffs 
asserted that the Ministers are public authorities who "have the power to make 
a determination with respect to their rights, obligations, or interests, ... and 
that they did so unlawfully." 113 They also argued that legitimate expectations 
to continue beech logging and to consultation before changes were made 
existed. The breach of these, it was argued, lead to a breach of natural justice. 
The arguments raised by the plaintiffs in Lumber Specialties were summarised 
by Hammond J as section 27 requiring the plaintiffs to be consulted and their 
interests considered. 114 Hammond J dismissed the application of section 27 of 
the Bill of Rights "on the basis advanced in this case."
115 
His view was that the defendants were assessing whether high 
government policy should be given effect to.
116 In situations of "high political 
policy, individual interests necessarily come into conflict with the whole."
117 
Hammond J's view was that courts should not be involved in assessments of 
high public policy issues. 118 Thus in cases involving high political policy the 
courts are not willing to consider whether an individual's rights have been 
considered during the decision making process. The effect of the Lumber 
111 This was the argument raised by Lumber Specialties. Lumber Specialties v Hodgson 
[2000] 2 NZLR 347,373 para 166-167 (HC) Hammond J. 
112 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson [2000] 2 NZLR 347 (HC) Hammond J. 
113 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 373 para 166. 
114 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 374 para 179. 
115 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 375 para 185. 
116 If individuated concerns had to be considered a large exercise in re-evaluation would be 
needed. If this was to occur, it would not just be these plaintiffs individual concerns that 
would be of importance but those of many individuals. 
117 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 375 para 183. 
118 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 375 para 184, citing Wellington City Council v 
Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537,546 (CA) Cooke P. 
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Specialties decision is that people who are effected face the burden of the 
decision, rather than society as a whole, who often benefit from the decision. 
Other countries offer comr.,ensation for such breaches, a consultation 
requirement is a comparatively lower standard to be reached. However, it can 
be argued that it is difficult to determine who should be consulted or 
considered, and also which views should be followed. 
Section 27 has its origins in Article 21(1) of the White Paper. The 
focus of Article 21 is procedural protection. 119 As procedural protection does 
not apply to the legislature, legislation is not within the ambit of section 27.
120 
Section 27 could apply in situations where legislation is not used to take the 
property. In such situations a hearing or consultation may be required. The 
commentary to Article 21 specifically states that it is for the court to decide 
which rights deserve this protection. 121 It is currently unclear whether the 
right to property is one of those rights. Lumber Specialties is decided on the 
basis of high policy rather than whether property is one of these rights. 
122 It 
should be possible therefore, in cases of executive action, that this protection 
may be available under this heading. Lumber Specialties is correct in saying 
that where a class generally is affected the right does not apply. The 
commentary to Article 21 states that the right is not envisioned to be 
applicable when a class generally is affected. 
123 
2 Substantive Protection 
(a) Case law 
The substantive argument is that when the right is being interfered 
with, natural justice may in fact require that the action does not occur, or that 
119 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper" [1984-85] I AJHRA6 l 10 para 10.168. 
120 Westco Lagan v Attorney General [2001] I NZLR 40, 53 para 50 (HC) McGechan J. 
121 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper" [ 1984-85] I AJHR A6 110 para 10.171. 
122 
123 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper" [1984-85] I AJHRA6 110 para 10.169. 
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some form of compensation be offered. 124 This is essentially an argument of 
takings or expropriation without compensation. 125 In Lumber Specialties"" 
Hammo"nd J records a possi:,le argument regarding section 27 not raised by 
the plaintiffs. 126 This was that in substance the plaintiff's arguments were 
"takings" arguments, and that the Government's change to a well established 
policy interfered with established property or contractual rights. 127 He 
describes this as being a substantive, rather than procedural, right under 
section 27. He refers to the United States Constitution and its provision that 
no property is to be taken without just compensation. 128 It was not possible 
for him to further consider this, as it was not raised in the pleadings. 129 
Hammond J appears neutral on whether such clauses are a good idea. 
However raising the argument outside of what was pleaded suggests he thinks 
that such a right should exist. It also suggests that he believes that the right 
may be present within section 27 .130 However, Hammond J' s comments 
about the substantive rights under section 27 of the Bill of Rights are obiter. 131 
In Westco Lagan v Attorney-General WCL argued that a Bill the 
government was in the process of enacting expropriated their property, 
without compensation, and therefore breached sections 21, 132 27(1) and 27(3) 
of the Bill of Rights Act. WCL submitted that it is a principle of natural 
justice, reinforced by international recognition and the Magna Carta c 29, 133 
that the crown cannot, and Parliament should not remove property rights in 
124 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson [2000] 2 NZLR 347, 373-374 para 170-171 (HC) 
Hammond J. 
125 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 374 para 172 and 178; Westco Lagan v Attorney 
General [200 l] 1 NZLR 40, 52 para 49 (HC) McGechan J. 
126 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 373 para 170. Hammond specifically confirmed 
with counsel that the course of argument was not being run . 
127 For these purposes it seems to be assumed that such contractual rights are in fact 
"property", although many academics argue that this is not always so. 
128 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 373 para 172, with reference to the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments. 
129 Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, above, 373 para 170, 
130 This is despite the fact that he refers to his idea as "an interesting question". Lumber 
Specialties v Hodgson, above, 374 para 177. 
131They were not raised in pleadings, so were put to one side. Lumber Specialties v Hodgson, 
above, 374 para 177. 
132 See Part VII C Section 21 . 
133 See Part VI B The Magna Carta. 
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the public interest without compensation. 134 The Attorney-General submitted 
that natural justice does not apply to the legislature 135 and that it does not 
extend to the deprivation of property. 
McGechan J concluded that the breach could not fall under section 
27(1) or natural justice. His reasoning was that section 27 (and 21) must be 
read as part of and within the context of its headings, and the rest of that part 
of the Bill of Rights. He reasoned, appropriately, that property rights do not 
fit within the context of "search arrest and detention." While the section must 
be read broadly and purposively to promote the rights conferred this is taking 
it too far. 136 As McGechan J reasoned "there are conceptual differences 
between rights to fair hearing and unbiased determinations on the one hand, 
and rights to compensation for expropriation on the other." 137 This supports 
the intrinsic unlikelihood of any intention to create an indirect compensation 
provision. 138 I agree with this analysis. The use of headings and context is an 
accepted part of the statutory interpretation process. It is supported by the 
view taken in Canada that such rights should not be slipped in via the back 
door. 139 
In Cooper v Attorney-Genera/140 Baragwanath J decided that section 
28ZGA of the Fisheries Act removed a substantive right but that it was 
unnecessary to respond to the submission that Parliament had no power to do 
this. His view was that the Bill of Rights Act "does not refer to property 
134 It was admitted that this goes beyond the usual meaning of natural justice, but WCL 
argued that its categories are not closed. Westco Lagan v Attorney General [200 l] 1 NZLR 
40, 52 para 49 (HC) McGechan J. This was done with reference to Re Erebus Royal 
Commission (1983] NZLR 662. 
135 Westco Lagan v Attorney General (2001) 1 NZLR 40, 53 para 50 (HC) McGechan J. Wells 
v Newfoundland [ 1999] 3 SCR 199, 223 Major J. 
136 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 & 55 para 58, 61 & 63. McGechan J 
described the move as a "journey through space". 
137 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 para 61. 
138 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 para 61. The argument relating to creating an 
indirect compensation provision was also made with reference to section 21 at para 58. 
139 Attorney-General of Quebec v Irwin Toy Limited (1989) I SCR 927; Andre Yan der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) 
87. See Part IV A Canada. 
14° Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
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interests" and therefore "we have no protection of property rights equivalent 
to the US Fifth Amendment". 141 
(b) Conclusions about the case law 
The view of McGechan J is supported by reference to Hansard and the 
Select Committee Reports on the Bill of Rights White Paper. Although there 
is no mention of extrinsic materials in the Interpretation Act 1999 142 it is 
widely accepted that Hansard can be used, in any situation, 143 to help interpret 
legislation. 144 Reference has also been made to explanatory notes, to 
amendments of bills and to the proceedings of select committees. 145 
Instructions to drafters, cabinet papers and departmental advice to a minister 
have expressly been excluded. 146 This use usually relates to the purpose of 
the legislation in question, but is sometimes more specific than this. 147 
However use of Hansard is supporting evidence only and thus not considered 
determinative. 148 
Statements were made in Hansard that indicate social and economic 
rights were not intended to be included. 149 They also state that the right to 
141 Cooper v Attorney-General, above, 483 . 
142 The Law Commission Report on the matter felt that the Courts were already applying the 
correct standards when using extrinsic aides so there was no need to legislate. John Burrows 
and John Fogarty ·"Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 200 I, 19-20. 
143 The original approach was that recourse would only occur if the meaning was not crystal 
clear in itself Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 , 640. Now Hansard may be used in any situation; 
Brewer v R [ 1994] 2 NZLR 229, 234; John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory 
Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 2001, 19. An exception applies in the situation of 
determining the scope of a power conferred by an Act of Parliament; R v Secretary of State 
for the Environment, ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] I All ER 195 . There was dissent on 
this point by Lord Cooke, saying that Hansard should be able to be used all the time; R v 
Secretary of State/or the Environment, ex parte Spath Holme Ltd, above, 400 Lord Cooke. 
144 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [ 1993] AC 593 referred to in Cooper v Attorney-
General [ 1996] 3 NZLR 480, 495 (HC) Baragwanath J. This was first applied in New 
Zealand in Marac life Assurance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [ 1986] I NZLR 576, 
587 (CA) Cooke P; where Cooke P said it would be unduly technical not to permit resort to 
Hansard. 
145 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 200 I, 17. 
146 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 2001, 19. 
147 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 2001 , 17. 
148 John Burrows and John Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 200 I, 18. 
149 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13040. This statement was made 
on introducing the Bill. Under the rules of statutory interpretation this gives a good idea of 
parliamentary purpose; See also Richard Northey (I O October 1989) 502 NZPD 13052. 
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property is not contained in the Bill of Rights. 150 While these comments were 
not made by the Minister to show the policy behind the Bill, as is the normal 
use of Hansard to decipher parliamentary intent, the governing party never 
raised a rebuttal to the accusations about the lack of property rights any of the 
times that it was raised. 
The final report on the White Paper comments on the lack of the 
inclusion of fundamental social and economic rights (including the right to 
property). The committee thought that such rights would be easier to include 
than before, as the previous justification of difficulties in the judiciary 
enforcing them ( due to allocation of resources issues 151 ) no longer existed. In 
Appendix A the Committee suggests that some of these rights be included.152 
This shows that the Committee thought that the White Paper, and the Bill 
introduced to the house, did not include protection for social and economic 
rights, specifically that of property. 
The arguments based on Hansard and the Select Committee clearly 
show that the legislature did not intend for the Bill of Rights to include a 
protection of the right to property. As such the Act should not try to be read 
in such a way as to "sneak through the back door" such a right. 
150 Warren Kyd (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3452. " I refer to some glaring defects in the 
Bill. . . . No view is taken on rights of property. Every well-drawn constitution, such as that of 
the United States, and the United Nations Bill of Rights, provides for rights of property, but 
that matter is not mentioned in the legislation." Mr Lee (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 347 
"There is no reference in the Bill to property rights. New Zealand is still, I hope, a property-
owning democracy - one that should be proud to be a property-owning democracy. However, 
it seems that even that is not now regarded as sacrosanct. Recent comments made by Labour 
Party members have suggested that these should now be some diminution of the importance 
of a property-owning democracy. It is not hard to realise where such a thought would have 
originated. It is also that the countries in which those thoughts are dominant are now going 
back to a property-owning philosophy." 
151 Richard Northey (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13052; thinks though still hard to enforce. 
Mr Graham also agrees with this statement (I O October 1989) 502 NZPD 13052. 
152 Justice and Law Reform Select Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand" [ 1987-90] XVII 
AJHR I8C I O. The committee recommended that there be a clause in the Bill saying "The 
right to own property and the right not to be deprived of private property for public use 
without just compensation". 
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In 1997 the ACT Party introduced the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Property Rights) Amendment Bill. 153 The basis for its introduction was that 
under the current Bill of Rights there was no protection of private property. 
This is demonstrated by the comments made on its second reading by Owen 
Jennings. "The bringing ohhis Bill to the floor of the House seeks to rectify a 
glaring omission from the New Zealand Bill of Rights A.et passed by this 
House in 1990."154 This demonstrates that many thought that the Bill of 
Rights did not contain a clause protecting private property rights. However 
just because a few members of Parliament did not think that the right was 
included in the Bill of Rights does not mean that it is not included. The 
Amendment was not read a second time due to lack of support in the house.155 
B Section 27(3) 
Section 27(3) was raised as a ground m Westco Lagan v Attorney-
General. 156 Section 27(3) states: 
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to 
defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those 
proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings 
between individuals. 
WCL submitted that section 27(3) aimed to ensure that the "Crown 
was no better than any other litigant",157 and that the proposed legislation 
breached this as it "moved the goal posts". 158 McGechan J concluded, 
however, that section 27(3) was irrelevant, as the issue at hand was not crown 
procedure in litigation, but substantive rights. 159 The legislature has the 
153 New Zealand Bill of Rights (Property Rights) Amendment Bill 1997, no 80-1. 
154 Owen Jennings (25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 6794 . Owen Jennings moved that the Bill 
be read a second time. 
155 (25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 6809. Ayes = 9 (ACT and United) all others were against. 
156 Westco Lagan v Attorney General (2001) I NZLR 40 (HC) McGechan J. 
157 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 53 para 52. 
158 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 53 para 52 . 
159 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 49 para 31. There is also discussion of the 
applicability of section 21 of Bill of Rights Act at paras 45, 46, and 56-59. See Part VII C 
Section 21 . Section 27 " is aimed at procedures which govern the assertion or denial of rights 
in the course of Court or equivalent proceedings; and is not aimed at the creation of other 
rights in themselves." Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 55 para 63 . 
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ability to place the Crown in a better position, as section 27(3) does not 
restrict the power of the legislature to decide what substantive rights the 
Crown · has. It merely di1ects that the Crown shall have no procedural 
advantage in any proceedings to enforce rights if such rights exist. 160 I agree 
with McGechan J's conclusions. The final sentence of section 27(3) makes it 
clear that the aim is that when the Crown is involved the procedure is the 
same as when there are two individuals. This view is supported by the White 
Paper commentary of article 21(3). It states that the aim of article 21(3) is to 
give161 
constitutional status to the core principle that the individual should be able 
to bring legal proceedings against the Government, and more generally to 
engage in civil litigation with it, without the government enjoying any 
procedural or jurisdictional privileges. (Emphasis added) 
Although McGechan J does not find that section 27 ( or section 21) 
will be breached by the passing of The Forest (West Coast Accord) Bill 2000, 
he implies that in principle it is inappropriate for the legislature to pass such 
an Act. He refers the high likelihood of such clauses being changed before 
becoming an Act, 162 due to their draconian nature. 163 He also refers to Courts 
usually being unwilling to allow the expropriation of property in such a 
way, 164 and states that the international norms are undeniable in their own 
right.165 
C Section 21 
Section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act states: 
160 Westco Lagan v Attorney General [200 I] I NZLR 40, 55 para 63 (HC) McGechan J. 
161 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper" [ 1984-85] I AJHR A6 111, I 0.176. The article was aimed at not altering the principle 
that was already reflected in the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. Hon Geoffrey Palmer 
Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" [1984-85] I AJHR 
A6 lll 10.176and 10.177. 
162 Although this did not actually occur here. Its likelihood is now much higher due to MMP. 
163 McGechan actually describes the clause as being draconian. Westco Lagan v Attorney 
General, above, 48 para 24. 
164 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above 55 para 61. 
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21. Unreasonable search and seizure - Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, or 
correspondence or otherwise. 
It has been argued that the phrase "unreasonable ... seizure ... of ... property" 
applies to deprivations of property. 
In Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-Genera/166 WCL raised this argument, 
based on a strict reading of the phrase. McGechan J states that the strict 
reading of section 21 could apply to an "uncompensated legislative 
annihilation of contractual rights." 167 First, he accepts that, annihilation can be 
seizure. 168 He then accepts that contractual rights are intangible property, and 
that intangible property could fall under section 21. 
However, McGechan J concluded that section 21 should not be read 
strictly. He looks at the headings within the Act, the context of the associated 
sections, the marginal notes and the legislative intent. 169 He concludes that 
the focus of the section is "plainly on prosecution and judicial process", 170 and 
that it would be "distinctly odd" to have within these a section dealing with 
takings without compensation. He argues, and I agree, that there is no fit with 
the surrounding sections, the headings or the marginal notes. This increases 
the likelihood that it was not Parliament's intent that section 21 be a takings 
section. McGechan J argues that he has not ignored the "strongly 
expansionist" tide flowing at present at appellate level in relation to 
application of the Bill of Rights." 171 Instead he argues that there is a 
difference between "thinking and wishful thinking" 172 and that it would not be 
165 West co Lagan v Attorney General [200 I] I NZLR 40, 54 para 61 (HC) McGechan J. 
166 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, [200 I] l NZLR 40 (HC) McGechan J. 
167 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 53 para 57. 
168 This is because the Bill of Rights requires a large liberal interpretation. While seizure does 
not normally encompass destroying, it is a possible interpretation. This is especially so as the 
impact on the former possessor is the same whether the item has been destroyed or taken. 
169 These are all valid considerations when interpreting a statute under the lnterpretation Act 
1999 s5(3). McGechan J's argument is supported by the ideas of using the scheme of the Act 
to help interpretation, and of not reading sections in isolation. John Burrows and John 
Fogarty "Statutory Interpretation" NZLS Seminar April 2001 13-14. 
170 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 Para 58. 
171 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 para 59. 
172 Westco Lagan v Attorney General, above, 54 para 59. 
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intellectually honest to expand section 21 in the manner sought. This 
conclusion is in line with Canadian decisions on a similar point. 173 
The comparative article in the White Paper supports his approach. 
The focus of Article 19 is search and seizure within the context of evidence 
gathering. The commentary draws parallels with Entice v Carrington 174 
which is about invasions of property, not parliamentary takings. The focus 
on evidence gathering is also shown by the discussions on the protection of 
privacy and the need for search warrants. 175 This is also shown by the 
article's comparison with the US Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), 
rather than the Fifth Amendment (takings). 176 
VIII IS THIS ADEQUATE PROTECTION? 
Private property, to a certain extent, is protected by the law in New 
Zealand today. There is limited protection with the common law and the 
Magna Carta. This protection is impeded by parliamentary supremacy. There 
is no protection contained in the Bill of Rights. 
A New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights also offers inadequate protection. Section 27 only 
allows procedural protection. Procedural standards do not apply to the 
legislature, thus the Bill of Rights cannot prevent enactments that enable the 
taking of property. Also it has not been decided whether this protection from 
executive actions actually extends to the right to property. Substantive 
protection was correctly ruled out in Westco Lagan v Attorney-General. 177 
173 Attorney-General of Quebec v Irwin Toy Limited (1989) I SCR 927 . See Part IV A 
Canada. 
174 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029. Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A 
Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper"[ 1984-85] I AJHR A6 paras I 0.145-10.146. 
175 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper"[l 984-85] I AJHR A6 103 para 10.144. 
176 Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper"[ 1984-85] I AJHR A6 l 05 para 10.151. 
177 See Part VII A 2 (b) Conclusions about the case law. 
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B Other Protections 
The protection offer~d by the Magna Carta is inadequate because of 
parliamentary supremacy and the phrase "but by the law of the land. Any 
statute that necessarily implies that the right has been overridden can remove 
the protection. This makes it too easy for parliament to remove property 
rights without directly facing the fact that this is what they are doing. The 
protection is also inadequate because of the reference to "freehold". Under 
the interpretation of McGechan J in Westco Lagan v Attorney-General this 
would not include all forms of property. If this interpretation was looked at 
again, however, it should be widened, removing this inadequacy. 
The protection under the common law is also inadequate. A statute 
that is not explicit can also override it. The protection offered by the PW A is 
good. It covers all the important elements found in comparative constitutions. 
This includes a detailed list of what to consider when offering compensation. 
However its protection is inadequate as it only applies to land being taken for 
public works, and it is even easier for another statute to override it as it is a 
totally ordinary statute. 
While elections are a check on Parliament' s actions, they are a blunt 
instrument. Voting is not issue by issue, but on many issues, and only every 
three years. It allows small abuses to keep occurring, constantly pushing the 
boundaries of what is acceptable. Elections therefore only prevent large 
abuses, or a large number of abuses. Elections also provide no redress for 
affected individuals. 
There is protection for non-legislative actions and actions not done 
under Acts. These actions can be treated as either breaches of the common 
law presumption in favour of compensation, or as breaches of c 29 of the 
Magna Carta. The PW A also applies to such actions. 
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IX SHOULD THE RIGHT BE IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 
The author submits t:iat it is important to consider whether the Bill of 
Rights should contain a written protection of property, similar to that 
contained in other jurisdictions. To be considered within the Bill of Rights it 
needs to both fit with the initial purpose and aims of the Bill of Rights. The 
right needs to be considered fundamental, able to be put in written form and 
be consistent with the rest of the Bill of Rights. 
A Is It a Fundamental Right? 
I think that the right to property is fundamental. However the question 
is not straightforward. Some argue that it is fundamental, others argue that it 
is an economic or social right and is therefore not fundamental. 
1 Arguments against it beingfundamental 
The rights non-inclusion in the Bill of Rights is an indication of the 
view at that time that it was not fundamental. This is also demonstrated by 
the failed attempt to include it in the Bill of Rights in 1997. The right was 
also not considered important enough to be in the ICCPR, 178 the original 
ECHR or the Canadian Charter. 179 
Another indication is the view that people's acceptance of the right 
may depend on the type of economic or governmental policies in place. The 
right to property is less acceptable in a laissez-faire economy than a system 
178 One of the reasons why it was not included in this document, however, was due to the 
jurisdiction of the ICCPR and its extension to foreign nationals living within a country 's 
territory. At this time a number of countries were wishing to return hnd from foreigners back 
to the original owners who were citizens. If the ICCPR contained a property clause then 
redistributions would not have been possible. 
179 It could also be because of the difficulties in defining the right and controversies involved 
in some aspects of how it is defined. Alberto M Aronovitz " Individual Patrimonial Rights 
Under the European Human Rights system - Some Reflections on the Concepts of Possession 
and Dispossession of Property" (1997) 25 Intl J Legal Info 87, 91. 
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with high government regulation. 180 As government policies on this change 
over time depending on the views of voters, then the public's acceptance of 
intervention can also changi..;. Due to the changing nature of views towards 
the right, it is inappropriate to freeze for the future such values merely because 
it is important today. 181 However, this should not affect whether the right 
exists at all. This argument is better used as a consideration when balancing 
between the public and individual interests involved. 
The view that property is not a fundamental right is put forward in Cooper v 
Attorney General where it is said that: 182 
No New Zealand authority supports the proposition that property rights are 
of such fundamental importance as to prevent Parliament from removing 
them by legislation which it considers to be required in the public interest. 
However the view that I am advocating is that few rights are so absolute, 
meaning that this should not be used as a reason against inclusion. It is 
possible for a right to be fundamental without being absolute. This is 
especially so in New Zealand where section 5 of the Bill of Rights makes it 
clear that no right is considered absolute, but that they can all be subject to 
limits. 
2 Arguments that it is fundamental 
Locke considered property to be an attribute of a man's personality.183 
If that is so it is of the same importance as the other rights that relate to the 
person, and should be given the same protection. This view is supported by 
180 James L Oakes "'Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today" (1981) 56 Wash L 
Rev 583 , 583 with reference to Justice Felix Frankfurter (1956) 19 "Of Law and Men". 
181 This was a concern raised with the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Hon DAM Graham 
(25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 6796 with reference to Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on a White Paper 
on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand." [ 1987-90] XVII AJHR I8C 28 para 4. 14. This was also 
raised in the debates on the Amendment Bill by Tony Ryall who stated that property rights are 
somethino that there is no broad national consensus on. Hon Tony Ryall (25 February 1998) 
0 
565 NZPD 680 I. 
182 Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480,495 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
183 James L Oakes '"Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today" (1981) 56 Wash L Rev 
583 , 584. 
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the idea that for the other rights to be truly effective there needs to be an 
effective right to property. For example the right to freedom of speech is 
useless ·if there is no right to a printing press. 
Property is pervasive within our legal system. New Zealand has a 
strong tradition of individual ownership. There are a lot of rules involving 
property such as theft, nuisance, trespass and other torts. Something so 
pervasive within society and the legal system should be fundamental. It 
seems wrong that the position is so different between the State and 
individuals. Individuals cannot trespass or commit theft but Parliament can. 
Something is needed to ensure that there is equality in this area. 
The fundamental nature of the right was demonstrated by the 
description given to the failed Bill of Rights in 1963. It contained what Hon 
Ralph Hanan described as "the six basic freedoms .... [including] the right of 
the individual to own property and the right not to be deprived thereof except 
in accordance with law." 184 This was also demonstrated by the Select 
Committee view of the White Paper, that after entrenchment had been 
removed, rights that may have been difficult for judges to enforce but were 
none the less of great importance should be included in the Bill. They argued 
that "[social and economic] rights are obviously as important to New 
Zealanders as the civil and political rights . . . and a number of submissions 
recommended their inclusion." 185 They specifically included the right to 
property in their proposed changes. There was also repeated mention on the 
passing of the Bill of Rights by the opposition about such an important right 
b . . 1 d d 186 not emg me u e . 
Another argument that shows that the right is fundamental is its 
position within the fundamental part of our common law and its protection in 
the Magna Carta. It is also described as fundamental by the LAC guidelines. 
184 Mr Graham, (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3464. 
185 Justice and Law Refonn Select Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand." [ 1987-90] XVII 
AJHR 18C 4. 
186 Warren Kyd (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3452; Mr Lee (14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 347. 
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,. 
The US case of Lynch v Household Finance Corp' 87 treated the right 
to property as a personal rig!it. 188 However there is no indication that this has 
been followed in New Zealand, or how widely accepted it is within the US. 
This is especially so given that the takings jurisprudence has gone through 
cycles over the last 150 years. 189 There have been changes from being harsh 
on the State, to lenient on takings to being strict on them again. 
B Should It Be In Written Form? 
It needs to be considered whether the right needs to be put into written 
form. Currently the right appears under the common law and the Magna 
Carta, however this protection is inadequate. 190 The question then is will a 
written form of the right included in our Bill of Rights provide better 
protection? 
I Against writing it down 
The main argument against writing it down is that it is a lot of trouble 
and expense when the result is likely to be similar to the current position. 191 
This is especially because section 4 of the Bill of Rights does allow explicit 
statutes to override the rightist contains. This is added to by section 28 of the 
Bill of Rights, which states that non-inclusion in the Bill of Rights does not 
mean that a right is not important. At the time the Bill of Rights was passed 
there were concerns about putting some rights on a pedestal and giving them 
more importance than others. While this is not something that we should aim 
to do, it is apparent that because the courts have adopted more rigorous 
187 Lynch v Household Finance Corp 405 US 538. 
188 Viewed favourably in James L Oakes "'Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today" 
( 1981) 56 Wash LR 583, 597 and also in Hamish Hancock "Economic Rights as Civil Rights" 
[1998] NZLJ 221. 
189 James L Oakes '"Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today" (1981) 56 Wash LR 
583. 
190 See Part VII B Other Protections. 
191 Mr Graham (10 Oct 1989) 502 NZPD 13043. This was also reflected in debate on the 
Amendment Act Hon DAM Graham (25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 6796. This view is 
supported by Hon Tony Ryal! (25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 680 I. 
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checking procedures under the Bill of Rights, the rights contained in it have 
achieved some higher standing. 192 This is especially s<, if the court can 
consider whether the limication is demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, and if it is not, can indicate this opinion. 193 
It should be recognised, however, that "constitutions are just one 
social instrument protecting economic, political and social rights." 194 Other 
forms of control such as "instilled civic virtues that enhance the value of 
reputation, good behaviour, tolerance etc act as powerful devices to insure that 
individual rights are respected". 195 This is especially so in New Zealand 
where there is no formal written constitution and much of the constitution is 
contained in the common law or constitutional conventions. 
Another argument against writing down such a right is that it may be 
considered to be an economic or social right. It has been argued that there is 
a "need to be careful not to constitutionalise economic rights in such a way 
that the courts start to involve themselves in questions of economic policy." 196 
This argument can however be overcome by phrasing the right in such a way 
that the court is not involved in making policy or distributive decisions but 
only checks on the way that the State takes land. 
2 For writing it down 
The original Bill of Rights reaffirmed rights already in place.
197 
The 
opposition at the time argued that it did not make sense to put into writing 
something already present in our legal system.198 Their argument was that the 
192 Especially with the possibility of gaining judicial declarations of incompatibility. 
193 See Part VA The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
194 Thomas E Borcherding "Commentary on the Schumiatcher Paper" (1988) I CJLT 209, 
214. 
195 Thomas E Borcherding "Commentary on the Schumiatcher Paper" (1988) 1 CJLT 209, 
215 . 
196 Hon Tony Ryall (25 February 1998) 565 NZPD 6801. 
197 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Long Title; Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of 
Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper"[ 1984-85] I AJHR A6 21 para 
3.1. 
!98 Mr Graham (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13043 . "I should have thought that most of 
those rights were well known in common law, and that there is not much to be gained by 
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jurisprudence had to start again, and that this would lead to uncertainty. This 
argument did rrot stand in 1990 and should not now. If something is important 
this is n·ot a reason against codifying the right. 
Including the right in the Bill of Rights increases the educative effect. 
The written form of a right is a lot more accessible and easier to understand 
than case law. The action of passing the amendment will help raise public 
awareness and knowledge on the issue. These arguments were also raised, 
and accepted, during the passing of the Bill of Rights. 
Since the passing of the Bill of Rights there has been more judicial 
scrutiny of Acts and actions that are in violation of the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights. This is despite the fact that these were rights that already 
played an important part of our legal system before the passing of the Bill. 
Accordingly the placing of the right to property within the Bill of Rights 
would bring greater scrutiny on the Acts and actions of the State with regards 
to property. While it may be argued that this is a breach of the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, it is not. Section 4 of the Bill of Rights clearly 
states this. However the Bill of Rights reinforces the judges' ability to 
consider the statute or action in terms of the Bill of Rights, and also brings 
public attention to issues that arise. This is especially so under the process 
that the courts have adopted when looking at statutes. 
199 It also means that 
there will be extra consideration when statutes are going through the 
legislative process, as the Attorney-General needs to make a report on any 
inconsistencies. 200 This places greater political onus on parliament as they are 
directly aware of any breaches that are occurring. 
During the discussions on the Bill of Rights it was argued that the right 
to property (and other more social or economic rights) should be contained 
putting them in this document." See also Mr RJS Munro ( 10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 
13055 "We oppose the idea of replacing well-defined rights by ill-defined ones." 
199 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). See Part V A The 
New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990. 
200 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 7. 
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within the Bill of Rights so as to have a complete list of rights.201 This was 
supported by the view of the select committee that the right should be 
included, once the problem of enforcement disappeared when it was decided 
that the Bill of Rights should not be entrenched. 202 
C Aims and Purposes 
The inclusion of the right to property is in line with some of the aims 
and purposes of the original Bill of Rights. If the right is framed in the 
negative then the aim of curbing State power when dealing with individuals 
will be met. However if property is considered to be an economic or social 
right this requirement will not be met. This is because the protection of such 
rights was not an aim of the Bill of Rights. Another aim of the Bill of Rights 
was to educate people about their rights. This would occur if any right was 
included in the Bill of Rights. The aim of meeting New Zealand's obligations 
under the IC CPR would not be met by including the right in the Bill of Rights, 
because it is not contained in the ICCPR. 
X HOW SHOULD IT BE PHRASED? 
The general theme that has emerged from other countries ' attempts to 
constitutionalise the right to property is that there are two ways to frame such 
a right. It can be framed negatively, in terms of limiting actions the State can 
take in regard to private property. If framing the right negatively it places a 
restriction on what would normally be a State ' s "legal right to deal as it thinks 
fit with anything and everything within its territory."203 If it is framed 
positively it gives someone a protected right to their property. It acts as a 
barrier, preventing governmental intervention. 
201 Richard Northey ( 14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3464. 
202 Justice and Law Reform Select Committee "Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand." [ 1987-90] XVII 
AJHR I8C 4 . 
203 Minister for the Army v Dalziel ( 1944) 68 CLR 261 , 284 Rich J. 
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The form that the right takes needs to reflect both the fact that we are 
all both independent individuals and part of the social whole.204 This is 
reflected in a number of countries where there is a need for a public purpose 
before any "taking" of property is valid. The principle is that whenever a 
taking occurs a balance between these competing interests is met. 
llA Right to the enjoyment of property 
(1) Every person shall be able to acquire property. 
(2) No one is to be deprived of the enjoyment of their property except by 
reason of a public purpose, on just terms, and by due process of law. 
A Subsection 1 -Acquiring Property 
In subsection ( 1) there is a clear statement that everyone should be 
able to acquire property. The intention with this section is that the usual 
grounds for discrimination (such as race, religion, sex, age) should not stop 
someone from acquiring property. It is not aimed to be a "positive" right to 
property. It is not a positive right as it does not say that everyone can have 
property, more that the opportunity exists for everyone. 
B Subsection 2 - Deprivations 
This section acts as a barrier between the State and property owners. 
It guarantees that once an individual owns property they can enjoy it without 
State interference. It is framed in the negative as it does not guarantee one 
property but limits the State's ability to interfere with property. If the State 
wishes to curtail one's enjoyment of property they may do so only if certain 
conditions are met. This negative framing fits with the rest of the Bill of 
Rights as it also acts as a limit on the State's powers in respect of the 
individual. 
204 Our role in the social whole allows for policies involving the spreading of wealth and 
ensuring that there is property in the future (ie conservation issues). 
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I Public purpose 
This is the first part of the balancing test. It is closely linked with the 
"just terms" requirement and any section 5 analysis.205 Society accepts that, 
with certain limits, some interference is acceptable, and indeed necessary. 
Interference with property will only be tolerated where there is a genuine 
reason for the interference to occur. It means takings, without a valid reason, 
should not occur. It requires the State to justify actions that encroach on 
people's private property. It does not stop the State from continuing with 
projects involving zoning, the environment or other changes as long as there is 
a public purpose. It merely requires that a public purpose such as these 
exists. If the right was framed in the positive then it would be impossible for 
the government to take any action that affected private property. 
The public purpose requirement is aimed at both accountability and 
the prevention of arbitrary takings. By needing to show public purpose, the 
government needs a reason for taking the property. The courts, while they 
should not be looking in depth at policies, can ensure that a policy does in fact 
exist. This ensures that before the taking occurs the government will need to 
have clearly thought about the policies involved, and the reason why they are 
taking the property. They will know that if they do not do so they will face 
the scrutiny of the court. It should prevent arbitrary takings, as the purpose 
must be legitimate. 
2 Just terms 
The phrase "just terms" covers a lot of the issues involved in State 
interference in private property without being too wordy. These include, but 
are not limited to, the public interest, compensation, and process. In Australia 
the phrase has been applied very broadly and includes such ideas as the public 
. . h d 1· . 206 mterest, compensat10n, t e process, an 1mmg. 
205 See Part VA The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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The phrase "just terms" allows a balance to occur between the 
individual and the State. The terms of any taking need to ensure that the 
individual is not bearing the burden for the whole. "Just terms" ensures that 
where the public benefits, the public take on some of the burden. This can 
often occur simply by the use of compensation for property that is taken. 
The phrase "just terms" includes, but is not limited to a requirement of 
compensation. Just terms of an acquisition must include such things as the 
timing of the acquisition and any notice that is given before the "taking" will 
occur. This is important as it also limits the power of the State to interfere in 
our property and stops any inherent advantage the State has. 
The reference to "just terms" covers the concept of proportionality. 
This involves the balancing of the public interest, with the considerations of 
individuals. The balance should involve whether the means fit the ends, 
timing, chances to make submissions and other terms of the taking. This test 
is used under the ECHR and in Australia. If there is a public interest but the 
action of "taking" the property is excessive compared to the end, then it would 
be harder for the terms of the "taking" to be just. 
This idea is also expressed in section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. This section requires any limitations on rights to be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.207 The test involved 
with this is essentially one of proportionality and considering whether the 
means fit the ends.208 
A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut. The means used must 
also have a rational relationship with the objective, and in achieving the 
objective there must be as little interference as possible with the right or 
freedom affected. 
206 See Part IV D I Just terms 
207 See Part VA The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
208 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 para 18 (CA). 
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It may be considered repetitive to include the second balancing test. However 
it should be included for certainty, and especially to ensure that compensation 
is part of the process. It is not as repetitive as the South African Constitution, 
but is clear enough as to what should be considered. 
A reference to just terms, rather than just a due process requirement, is 
necessary for two reasons. One is that there is no explicit compensation 
section within the Bill of Rights Act. This means that there is not an inherent 
right to receive money if an action is taken under the Bill of Rights. While the 
court has decided that compensation is available in some situations,209 without 
the reference to "just terms" I am not sure that this would occur as often as it 
would with the phrase in the section. However in situations where there is no 
question of the plaintiff having acted illegally (as was the situation in Baigent) 
there is probably more chance ofreceiving compensation.2 10 
The idea of "just" terms rather than "full and fair" terms is important 
for a number of reasons. The first is that "just terms" is much wider and 
allows a balancing test to occur. Full compensation may not actually reflect 
th . l d h . b . . l 211 e socia nee t at 1s emg put m p ace. The other is that compensation 
for grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty) do not represent the 
full value of property that was taken. It would therefore be unfair for modern 
day takings to receive full compensation. 
The phrase "just terms" is a good one as it covers a lot of ideas, 
without being too wordy. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is not a very 
209 Simpson v Attorney General (Baigent 's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
210 There seems to be a reluctance to offer damages as a remedy in Bill of Rights cases. This 
is largely because often those who make use of the Bill of Rights complain about police 
action when they have already been suspected of a crime. They tend to be thought of less 
favourably than those who "have done nothing wrong". This general attitude was reflected in 
Baigent's Case and Hammond J's comments about the Bill of Rights being used by "bleary 
eyed drunk drivers and their lawyers;" Lumber Specialties v Hodgson [2000] 2 NZLR 347, 
373 para 169 (HC) Hammond J. 
211 For example there may be a regulation preventing me from polluting my own land, which 
is a regulation that affects my right to property. Under some jurisdictions this level of 
regulation may be a reason to give compensation, however the public good in this situation is 
large (saving the earth for future generations) so the balance towards giving compensation 
would be less than if the public good was smaller, or the regulation covered more than just 
that aspect of a persons control over their property. 
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wordy Act. However by using this one simple phrase it ensures that particular 
aspects of the balancing process will occur, even if they would have occurred 
anyway under section 5. It is added for clarity. Small phrases such as this 
have been adequate in other countries for developing such balancing tests.212 
3 Due process of law 
This has been added to ensure that the State follows a proper process 
when expropriating property. It is primarily aimed at the executive. It has 
been added for clarity also. This is because of the uncertainty as to whether 
property is protected under s27 of the Bill of Rights. It also acts as an 
additional safeguard if the courts do not include procedural protection within 
the scope of "just terms". 
D The Level of Judicial Involvement 
It may be argued that under this process there is too much court 
involvement, breaching the principle of the separation of powers. The main 
concern is the courts actions in considering whether the purpose that the State 
is aiming to achieve is a good one or not. It needs to be remembered, 
however, that this occurs under the section 5 proportionality test with all of 
the other rights included in the Bill of Rights. In Australia a similar issue was 
considered. The court's view was that whether Parliament thought something 
was "just" was an important consideration, but not the only consideration.
213 
This showed a reluctance of the court to always substitute its decisions for 
those of other branches. However as the court can list factors that need to be 
considered when deciding on "just terms", it would be possible for courts to 
check that those factors were considered. As considerations are often concrete 
things like valuations, rather than subjective ideals, it is easier for the courts to 
impose such decisions on other branches.
214 
212 This has occurred in the ECHR and Australia. See Part III C the European Convention on 
Human Rights; and Part IV D I Just terms. 
213 Australian Apple & Pear Marketing Board v Tanking (1941) 66 CLR 77, I 04 Rich J. See 
Part IV D I Just terms. 
214 This is similar to the role played by the courts in judicial review. 
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If the right is phrased in the positive the courts will become involved 
in questions of the allocation of resources (this is more so if the document is 
entrenched). This is a question of "high policy" and is something that the 
courts in New Zealand have, for good reason, been hesitant to look into. It 
would, therefore, not be appropriate for the courts to decide how property 
should be allocated and whether a particular person's property is sufficient for 
their needs. This idea is backed by the large differences in opinion as to how 
property should be allocated. It is easier for the courts to consider whether an 
action of the State infringes the rules set out in the Act. 
It may also be argued that there is a breach of parliamentary supremacy. 
Eventually, however, section 4 of the Bill of Rights will mean that any statute 
that is explicit enough will be able to trump the Bill of Rights. Also, the court 
has already been considering whether compensation is adequate under the 
PWA. 
E Ideas Not Included 
While there is no definition of property or property rights within the 
section, this issue can easily be solved by looking at current case law 
assuming property to be a bundle of rights. 
215 There is also no express 
mention of the difficult problem that has been faced repetitively overseas, 
with regards to the distinction between a mere regulation and regulations that 
are deemed takings. There is a lot of jurisprudence on this matter and it is a 
problem in many jurisdictions. However, due to time and space constraints, 
this issue has not been considered in any depth. To be certain on this problem 
any property rights clause that is drafted would need to consider this issue, 
and deal with it appropriately. 
21s Dahya v Dahya [1991] 2 NZLR 150; Rabadan v Gale [1996] 3 NZLR 220; Millns v Borek 
[ 1986] 1 NZLR 302; Re Marshall (Deceased) & Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Public 
Trustee [ 1965] NZLR 851. The same idea is also used in the USA in Penn Central 
Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 04, 130-131. 
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XI CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, despite several attempts to prove 
otherwise, does not currently protect a person's right to property. The right to 
does, however, exist under the common law and the Magna Carta. The 
control on, especially parliamentary action, through these is very limited. 
Also while the common law is an important messenger the need to have a 
clear document and also the educative etc role that the Bill of Rights plays are 
reasons for the right needing to be included within the Bill. While there are 
many reasons pointing against inclusion, I feel that to make a clear point, and 
so that everyone understands how much importance the right has in New 
Zealand it should be included within the Bill of Rights. Inclusion will reflect 
the fundamental role of property within our western, liberal, capitalist 
democracy. 
Inclusion will lead to certainty in the law. 
If the right was to be included within the Bill of Rights Act, it should 
be negatively framed, restricting the power of the State to interfere with the 
property of individuals. A balance needs to be achieved between the public 
good and the rights of the individual. To achieve that balance the reference to 
just terms and public purpose within the section that I have drafted will 
attempt to solve this problem. 
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XIII APPENDIX B - RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
4. Other enactments not affected 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed 
or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill 
of Rights. 
5. Justified limitations-
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred-
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shal I be 
preferred to any other meaning. 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with Bill of Rights-
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-
General shall ,-
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that 
Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction 
of the Bill,-
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill 
that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights. 
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21. Unreasonable search and seizure -
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
whether of the person, property, or conespondence or otherwise. 
27. Right to Justice -
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the 
power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to 
defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those 
proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil 
proceedings between individuals. 
28. Other rights and freedoms not affected-
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by 
reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is 
included only in part. 
B Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
Article 17 
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others. 
No one shall be arbitraril y deprived of his property. 
C The European Convention on Human Rights 
Protocol 1, Article 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
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interest and subject to the conditions provided for by Jaw and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties. 
D Canada 
1 The Canadian Bill of Rights 
1. It is hereby recognised and declared that in Canada there have existed 
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, namely, 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and 
enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by the 
due process of law. 
2 The Canadian Charter of Rights 
Legal Rights: Life, Liberty And Security Of Person. 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
E The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of Jaw of general 
application, and no Jaw may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
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for a public purpose or in the public interest; and subject to compensation, the 
amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either 
been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public 
interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including 
the current use of the property; 
the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
the market value of the property; 
the extent of direct State investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
the purpose of the expropriation. 
( 4) For the purposes of this section the public interest includes the nation's 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to 
all South Africa's natural resources; and property is not limited to land. 
(5) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access 
to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure ofland is legally insecure as a result 
of past racially discriminatory Jaws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the State from taking legislative 
and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to 
redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure 
from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of 
section 36(1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
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36. ( 1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors , including 
the nature of the right; 
the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
the nature and extent of the limitation; 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights . 
F United States of America 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of Jaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the Jaws. 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated , and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
G Australian Constitution 
Section 51 
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The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the commonwealth with respect 
to-
the acquisition of prope1ty on just terms from any State or person for 
any purpose in respect of which Parliament has power to make laws. 
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